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ABSTRACT 
American law and English law belong to the same legal tradition, the 
common law, characterized by a case-law system based on judicial 
decisions and the rule of precedent. There are indeed common features 
between the American and the English common law systems. There is a 
common language with close expressions, but also similar concepts, 
principles and procedures. But how common are in fact the American and 
British legal systems? This paper aims at finding some possible answers 
through a legal and linguistic analysis of some US and UK superior court 
decisions.  
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1. Introduction: the beginnings and evolution of the Plain language movement  
The starting point of this paper is the presumption that, as the United States (US) and 
the United Kingdom (UK) share a common language (English), their respective legal 
systems may also share a common law. Obviously, American law and English law 
belong to the same legal tradition, the common law, characterized by a case-law system 
based essentially on judicial decisions and the rule of precedent. The common law has 
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now become one of the most important legal families in the world1 alongside with civil 
law. But how common are the American and British common law systems? To 
paraphrase Bernard Shaw’s words, aren't the UK and the USA two countries separated 
by a common legal system? This paper aims at finding some possible answers through a 
legal and linguistic analysis of some US and UK superior court decisions that constitute 
an interesting indicator of two existing patterns of the common law. 
In order to account for the possible common or different features of American and 
British common law systems, one needs to refer to the historical roots of the two 
systems. The common law  ̶ so called because it was intended to apply uniformly to 
courts of various jurisdictions ̶  was born in England during the 12th century through the 
development of the curia regis (King's court) and royal courts that contributed to the 
gradual establishment of a state in a feudal society. Circuit judges thus spread local 
custom across the whole territory, which contributed to the establishment of a common 
set of legal rules. During the 17th century and the rise of the British Empire, those who 
had emigrated from England to the thirteen British colonies perpetuated and 
implemented the laws and rules under which they had lived in their homeland 
throughout the world.  
Nevertheless, the newly independent states of America distanced themselves from 
their English legal roots because of their situation and living conditions. French legal 
scholars highlight a “separatist” movement (Levasseur, 2004: 4), or a “distancing 
phenomenon” (Bullier, 2012: 8) in the USA from British legal traditions. While some 
commonwealth countries developed their own legal principles consistently with the 
British common law,2 American common law walked an autonomous path, especially 
since the 1776 Declaration of Independence and the adoption of a single written 
constitution in 1789. This clearly severed the bonds between the colonies and the 
British Crown and marked a turning point in the development of American common 
law, separately and autonomously from English judicial decisions. The latter were no 
longer used as binding precedents by American courts. Initially the laws of the 
American colonies were intended not to contradict the laws of the Realm of England, 
though inevitably “the British common law was eluded when the settlers considered it 
as inappropriate, inadequate or going against their interests or convictions” (Zoller, 
2014: 5),3 as confirmed by Blackstone, in his famous Commentaries:  
 
Such colonists carry with them only so much of the English law as is applicable to their 
own situation and the condition of an infant colony; such, for instance, as the general rules 
of inheritance, and of protection from personal injuries. The artificial refinements and 
distinctions incident to the property of a great and commercial people, the laws of police 
and revenue, (such especially as are enforced by penalties,) the mode of maintenance for 
the established clergy, the jurisdiction of spiritual courts, and a multitude of other 
provisions, are neither necessary nor convenient for them, and therefore are not in force 
(1893: 85-86). 
 
Consequently, even though the USA did adopt common law rules and procedures 
originating from English common law during the 17th and 18th centuries, American law 
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today is clearly distinct from English law. The multiple and profound changes 
undergone by American common law were mainly conditioned by their new political 
environment as well as human experience and geographical living conditions. The 
traditional English opposition between Chancery courts and common law courts, for 
example, was not transposed to the USA, as Oliver Wendell Holmes argued in Black 
and White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co. (276 
U.S. 518): 
 
The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is 
not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that 
State without regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere else (1928: 533-
534). 
 
The strength of the common law is often said to lie in its capacity to develop and 
adapt to the environment in which it is applied. The fact that American and British 
societies developed autonomously naturally gave birth to acculturated laws that now 
differ to some extent in the US and the UK, as stated in the British case Sue Axon v. The 
Secretary of State for Health (The Family Planning Association) [2006] EWHC 37 
(Admin) regarding the question of abortion: 
 
[A] second reason why the American cases do not assist in this case is that the social and 
moral values of American society are very different from those which are prevalent in the 
United Kingdom. There is sensitivity and a controversy regarding the availability of 
abortion which does not exist on a comparable scale in this country (Justice Silber, 2006: 
§37). 
 
Acculturation, in this context, refers to the fact that case law follows the needs and 
expectations of the society where it is applied, which explains that the common law has 
evolved in the USA and the UK in keeping with acculturation phenomena. As a 
consequence, even if American law takes its roots in English law, the two countries 
being culturally different, their respective legal systems logically diverge to some 
extent. Amongst the main factors which explain why American common law came to 
differ from its English counterpart, Levasseur highlights the existence of a federal 
government, a written constitution and a specific procedure of judicial review (69). 
In order to underscore the possible similarities and divergences between American 
and British common law superior court decisions, our paper focuses on three main 
areas: the differences between the workings of the US and UK Supreme Courts, an 
analysis of the discourse structure of US and UK superior court decisions and the 
terminology used by American and British judges and finally, legal reasoning methods 
applied in both American and British common law. 
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2. Differences between the workings of US and UK Supreme Courts  
 
A first common feature of the American and British legal systems lies in the fact that 
both have a supreme court. The US Constitution, also called “the Supreme law of the 
land”, provides that the judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and other federal 
courts.4 This constitutional court, which sat for the first time in 1790 and is currently 
composed of nine justices (the Chief Justice of the United States and eight Associate 
Justices), rules on hundreds of appeal cases every year, from early October until July. 
The current English judicial system, which was first organized by the 1873 and 1875 
Judicature Acts and its following amendments, was profoundly changed in 2005 with 
the passage of the Constitutional Reform Act which replaced the Appellate Committee 
of the House of Lords by the UK Supreme Court as the leading judicial authority in 
charge of scrutinizing the application of the common law within the UK. Currently, 
twelve UK Supreme Court Justices hear appeals on legal questions of public importance 
from the beginning of October until the end of July.  
At first sight, both supreme courts would seem to share common features: they are 
situated at the apex of their respective court systems in which a similar notion of 
hierarchy between inferior courts and superior courts is applied and both US and UK 
Supreme Court judges decide to grant or deny permission to present the appealed case 
to the court by selecting the cases they consider worth reviewing in the light of the 
significant legal issues at stake.5 Nevertheless, one important difference lies in the fact 
that the US Supreme Court exercises a unifying role on federal and constitutional law, 
whereas in the UK the situation is different inasmuch as Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland have, to a greater or lesser degree, kept their judicial autonomy, their own court 
systems and legal principles, as explained on the official website of the UK Supreme 
Court:  
 
For historical reasons, as a state made up of several separate jurisdictions, the United 
Kingdom does not have a single unified legal system. Instead, there is one system for 
England and Wales, another for Scotland, and a third for Northern Ireland.6 
 
The UK, then, is a non-unified legal system with three jurisdictions (England and 
Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland) leading to the existence of a number of judicial 
particularities such as, for instance, the High Court of Justiciary7 which is Scotland's 
supreme criminal court. However, the UK Supreme Court retains jurisdiction when an 
infringement of human rights is alleged under the Human Rights Act 1998 or when a 
devolution or compatibility issue is raised under the Scotland Act 2012.8 Consequently, 
even if both the American and British legal systems have a supreme court, it is clear 
that their roles are not entirely similar. 
Federalism is the cornerstone of the American political system of government. As 
such, the US Supreme Court fulfils two main functions; firstly, it interprets federal (and 
at times state) laws brought before the court within the framework of a particular case in 
which one or several legal questions are raised. For instance, in Lawrence v. Texas 539 
U.S. 558 (2003), the legal question raised was to determine if the criminal convictions 
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of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas “Homosexual Conduct” law 
(section 21.06 Homosexual Conduct Texas Penal Code), which criminalized sexual 
intimacy by same-sex couples but not identical behaviour by different-sex couples 
violated their Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection under the law. This 
example, among many others, goes to illustrate the fact that the vocation of the US 
Supreme Court is not to unify state laws by imposing a federal common law but rather, 
to guarantee the respect of the U.S. Constitution on the part of all states. Secondly, the 
US Supreme Court exercises judicial review  ̶ i.e. the authority to invalidate legislative 
acts if contrary to the constitution ̶ since its judges bear the ultimate responsibility of 
ensuring that legislative, executive and administrative actions are in keeping with the 
Constitution. In a pending case, the Court is invited to confirm (or not) the 
constitutionality of the challenged state or federal law(s). Judicial review, even if not 
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, is one of the pillars of American rule of law. In 
the 1803 landmark case Marbury v. Madison, the US Supreme Court took the initiative 
of interpreting the Constitution to mean that one of the key constitutional roles of the 
judicial branch was to check the constitutionality of a federal statute. From then 
onwards, American common law acquired a specific dimension alien to English 
common law. 
Unlike the US Supreme Court, the UK Supreme Court is not a constitutional court, 
strictly speaking. Although guaranteeing the application of the common law in the UK, 
the protection of human rights and the non-infringement of the body of laws of a 
constitutional nature,9 it does not check the constitutionality of laws.10 French legal ELP 
specialist Gibson-Morgan points out the main difference between the US and UK 
Supreme Courts when she underlines that “The UK Supreme Court was not modelled 
on the federal Supreme Court” (2014: 94). On the one hand, the UK Supreme Court is 
bound by parliamentary sovereignty, which prevents it from going against statute law. 
Additionally, there is no distinction of nature between constitutional principles or texts 
as the fundamental legal standards, and ordinary legislation passed by the British 
legislature, both are Acts of Parliament. The role of the UK Supreme Court is then to 
scrutinize the application of the common law in a non-unified legal system. This role 
differs from its American counterpart, described as the Keeper of the Constitution that 
protects individual constitutional rights. On the other hand, considering the different 
nature of US and UK political systems, the UK Supreme Court is not a federal court 
even if it guarantees some degree of legal uniformity over the different jurisdictions of 
the UK.  
Finally, there ensues from the differences in function between the US and UK 
Supreme Courts that distinctions in terminology exist as well. One of the most 
significant is related to the notion of “judicial review”, a term which exists in both the 
American and British legal systems but refers to two different concepts. In American 
English, judicial review refers to “the ability of the court to declare a Legislative or 
Executive act in violation of the Constitution”,11 as Garner further explains in his 
Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage: 
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The BrE [British English] uses are quite different because G.B. [sic] does not have judicial 
review in the American sense: courts cannot invalidate primary legislation (though they 
review the decisions of lower courts). British writers use judicial review to refer to a 
relatively new procedure in England [...] that enables a litigant to challenge an 
administrative action by a public body (485). 
 
It is clear, then, that the US Supreme Court stands in sharp contrast to its British 
counterpart when it exercises judicial review. It has played a vital role in America's 
social and economic life due to its wide power of interpretation, that is to say “judging 
primary legislation against fundamental constitutional problems […] checking whether 
norms are in agreement with the Constitution” (Gibson-Morgan, 2014: 84). This is 
particularly true of landmark cases in the field of civil rights such as Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka (1954), often commented on as a clear example of American 
judicial activism. The case put an end to the discriminatory principle of “separate but 
equal” established at the end of the 19th century by US Justices themselves and 
considered as one of the reasons for decades of segregation in certain states. 
After this brief overview of some of the differences between American and British 
common law systems, notably the American principle of the sovereignty of the 
Constitution being opposed to the British principle of the sovereignty of Parliament, we 
now focus on questions of language and discourse organisation through an analysis of 
some US and UK superior court decisions. These texts, listed in the bibliography, have 
been selected as they highlight the legal mechanisms used to structure court decisions: 
implementation of the rule of precedent, distinction between ratio decidendi (the 
principle that the case establishes) and obiter dictum (a remark in a judgment that is 
“said in passing”), adaptation of case law to societal needs and legal reasoning 
techniques used by common law judges. Such texts consistently illustrate how structural 
features have shaped legal discourses and impacted legal language. 
 
 
3. Discourse structure of superior court decisions  
 
In the US, as in the UK, judicial decisions are publicly read during the final hearing and 
subsequently published in a judgment signed by all the judges. Contrary to French 
judges who withdraw behind the anonymity of the court, common law judges sign their 
decisions, aptly called “opinions” in American law. This practice, common to the US 
and the UK, constitutes the cornerstone of a legal case-law system in which the judges 
are invited to declare what the law is and justify their statements and interpretations 
explaining how they reached their conclusion. What does an analysis of the macro-
structure of American and British judicial decisions reveal about the divergences and 
similarities between the US and the UK? To answer the question, we decided to start 
from what the reader sees at first sight when looking at a court decision in terms of its 
general layout and formal structure, before moving on to a further analysis of the textual 
implementation of relevant legal mechanisms.  
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To start with, the manner of citing cases is not exactly the same on the two sides of 
the Atlantic. In the UK, as in the US, a judgment is published by a specialized publisher 
who may add particular indications in order to make the first approach to the document 
easier. Firstly, we find the publishing references of the case in the different Law 
Reports such as in Example 1, a screen shot taken from the British Bailii website.12 
 
 
Example 1. Different publishing references of the Gillick case 
 
Since 2001, the system of neutral citation for cases has been implemented in the UK 
so as to identify a case without referring to any publisher but to the court of law that 
handed down the decision. The neutral citation refers to the name of the parties (Gillick 
v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA), the year of judgment in brackets ([1985]), then the 
court (UKHL) and finally the case number (7).  
To compare if the citation methods are the same, let us take the example of an 
American case: City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co is cited as City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co 488 U.S. 469 (1989). As already mentioned, American judicial decisions are 
first publicly read, then published by specialized publishers and in this citation, “488” 
refers to the volume in which the decision was published, “U.S.” stands for ‘United 
States Reports’, the name of the publisher, “469” refers to the page from which the 
quotation is taken and, finally, the year the decision was handed down is indicated. 
There is no system of neutral citation in American law. 
Secondly, the macro-structure of UK and US superior court decisions is 
characterized by the presence of subparts and references that may not be the same in the 
two systems. In a UK judgment, the different hearing dates, as well as the date of the 
hearing of the published decision, are mentioned. These indications are absent from the 
texts of US Supreme Court decisions when published. Next, in the UK some 
“catchwords”, as referred to by the editing publisher, are inserted which can be useful to 
identify the legal fields covered by the case at first glance. Such keywords are not 
included within American judicial decisions. The next subpart, called “headnote” in 
English law, summarizes the relevant facts of the case and its context. In American 
common law, when a decision is published, a part is added to the text originally read in 
court when the decision is announced. This introduction, called “syllabus”, consists in a 
summary of the decision with the key arguments raised in the majority opinion (see 
Example 2).  
 
66  Alicante Journal of English Studies 
          
Example 2: Part of the syllabus in an American case 
Deborah Morse, et al., Petitioners v. Joseph Frederick 551 U. S. ___ (2007) 
 
Each time a ruling is published, the syllabus is introduced at the top of the first page 
of the document with the following paragraph: 
 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as being done in 
connection with the case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part 
of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the 
convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co, 200 U.S. 
321, 327.  
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This was clearly indicated in the 1906 Detroit case, when US Justices pointed out 
that “the headnotes of the opinions of this Court are not the work of the Court, but are 
simply the work of a Reporter, giving his understanding of the decision ...” (ibid., 327). 
Consequently, these introductory remarks may simply be interpreted as providing 
reader guidance as to what was decided and how, but have no legal value per se. 
In the judicial decisions of both countries, the headnote (or syllabus) is immediately 
followed by a short summary of the judgment introduced by the word “Held”. This 
summary focuses on the leading judgment and the points of law scrutinized by the 
court. Such a presentation is the same in US and UK superior court decisions as 
illustrated in the extract above taken from Deborah Morse, et al., Petitioners v. Joseph 
Frederick 551 U. S. (2007). Another difference between American and British common 
law systems lies in the presence or absence of references to dissenting opinions. In the 
US, the syllabus does not include any precise references to the existing concurring or 
dissenting opinions that are actually published in the text of the ruling. On the other 
hand, in the English part called “headnote”, all dissenting positions are highlighted with 
reference to the name of the dissenting judge so as to make it easier to find the relevant 
information in the body of the text.  
In the UK, depending on the publisher, other decisions have notes which refer to the 
paragraphs of the Digest of the Legal Encyclopedia (Halsbury’s Law and Halsbury’s 
Statutes) to which the legal issues are related, in order to guide the reader with regard to 
the doctrinal position on this issue. Such is not the practice in American common law. 
Next, there follows an exhaustive list of all cases the judges refer to in the obiter dictum 
(see Example 3), which is not a practice used in decisions handed down by the US 
Supreme Court. 
 
 
Example 3: List of the cases referred to in the Gillick case, extract taken 
Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbeck Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, 115 
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Finally, there is the judgment13 itself. The judgment of each British judge is 
presented in extenso, one judgment after the other. Each judgment is released in a single 
block of opinion with an internal structure, usually following the different legal issues 
that have been assessed,14 but without any subparts. The dissenting opinions are not 
eluded; they are published equally to the leading position, but are identified as 
dissenting for a clear understanding of the decision, as discussed in more detail below. 
In some of the British decisions selected here, each opinion concludes with expressions 
such as “I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble 
and learned friend, [...]. I agree with it and for the reasons he gives I would dismiss this 
appeal” (Lord Templeman, 1994: 2, Murray v DPP). In American Supreme Court 
decisions, US justices explicitly express their disagreement in dissenting opinions as, 
for example Justice Sotomayor in Berghuis v. Thompkins 560 U.S. ____ (2010): “and 
because the Court’s answers to those questions do not result from a faithful application 
of our prior decisions, I respectfully dissent” (2010: 2, dissenting opinion). 
Finally, the structure of a UK superior court decision stands in sharp contrast with 
the structure of a US Supreme Court decision. Between 1801 and 1835, under Chief 
Justice Marshall, the English practice of seriatim judicial opinion, i.e. each opinion read 
individually, was discontinued. Nowadays, the text of an American ruling in a given 
case is composed of several parts, as illustrated in Glossip v. Gross 576 U.S. ___ 
(2015):  
 
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, 
KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
THOMAS, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SCALIA, J., 
joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. 
SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and 
KAGAN, JJ., joined (2015: 3-4, syllabus). 
 
First, there is the opinion of the Court, also called the majority opinion, i.e. the 
enforceable part of the decision which has legal effect, delivered here by Justice Alito. 
It corresponds to the text agreed upon by a majority of the judges and written either by 
the Chief Justice if s/he is in the majority or another justice chosen by the Chief Justice. 
If the latter is not in the majority, the majority will decide who drafts the opinion of the 
Court. There is also the possibility of having concurring opinions (two in the above 
example). A concurring opinion is drafted by a judge who agrees with the majority 
decision but may base his or her own decision on complementary or different 
arguments. Finally, there are dissenting opinions (two in the above example) when 
judges in the minority want to draft their own text to express their disagreement with, 
and at times harsh criticism of, the arguments presented in the opinion of the Court. 
Each justice may conclude his or her text by saying “I concur” or “I dissent”. And, as 
illustrated above, it is even possible to concur with a dissenting opinion. Some US 
Justices are famous for their dissents as, for example, Justice Harlan in Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896) or Sonia Sotomayor in more recent cases such as Schuette, Attorney 
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General of Michigan v. Coalition to defend Affirmative Action, Integration and 
Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality by any Means Necessary (BAMN) et al. 
(2014): 
 
But I part ways with the plurality when it suggests that judicial intervention in this case 
“impede[s]” rather than “advance[s]” the democratic process and the ultimate hope of 
equality. Ante, at 16. I firmly believe that our role as judges includes policing the process of 
self-government and stepping in when necessary to secure the constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection. Because I would do so here, I respectfully dissent (2014: 6, dissenting). 
 
In the UK, superior court cases are held in consistence with the position of the 
majority of judges. Generally, the first judgment presented when a decision is published 
is the most important one with respect to the legal issues at stake and represents the 
leading opinion. In lower court decisions, where a consensus is reached on the case, 
only one judgment may be presented in extenso, while the two other judges' opinions 
are limited to a simple expression, “I agree”. Where no consensus is reached, each 
opinion counts. In order to make these accessible to legal practitioners, all the opinions 
are published comprehensively, either concurring with or dissenting from the leading 
one that ruled the case. 
These structural differences may originate from the drafting process which varies 
between the US and the UK. US Justices hear oral arguments from both sides during 
generally two weeks. They then spend several weeks deliberating, passing a draft of the 
decision between each other until the writing of a final text. This version has to be 
approved by a majority of five votes at least. Judges in the minority will proceed 
similarly. Due to this collective drafting process, the text of an American judicial 
decision is composed of different parts. On the other hand, the British drafting process 
seems different even though it evinces the same plurality of judges and judgments. 
Where American judges’ opinions are presented according to their position (in the 
majority, concurring or dissenting), no such presentation is highlighted in British cases. 
In spite of divergences in textual organisation between American and British common 
law systems, US and UK superior court decisions share one common structuring 
mechanism, the doctrine of stare decisis or the rule of precedent, that similarly shapes 
judicial discourse. 
In the two countries, stare decisis is the linchpin of common law. In order to 
discover how the mechanism of precedent works, English law students are usually 
taught how to distinguish the two different parts of the decision: ratio decidendi (i.e. the 
rule of law that is binding over cases on similar relevant facts) and obiter dictum (i.e. 
the legal reasoning followed by the judge to argue his/her position, but which has no 
legally binding framework). Distinguishing between the two is not an easy task 
considering the number and length of common law judicial decisions since these two 
parts coexist but are not clearly distinguished. British judges are not expected to 
construct their legal reasoning on the basis of structured discourse organisation. As a 
consequence, what belongs to ratio decidendi, and what must be read as obiter dictum 
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is left for legal practitioners and academics to discover and is sometimes subject to 
controversy.  
Ratio decidendi is the legal decision strictly speaking. In other words, what will 
remain as a legal principle and what is intended to become the legal precedent that will 
bind lower courts in similar subsequent cases. Consequently, ratio decidendi is 
considered as the most important part of the decision, even when it is expressed in a 
fewer number of words compared to the length of the obiter dictum. Most of the time, 
ratio decidendi is formulated unambiguously so as to avoid any diverging 
interpretation. Following are two examples which serve to illustrate the differences 
between the two parts of a British judicial decision. The first one is taken from R v 
Howe & Bannister [1987] AC 417: 
 
(…) As I can find no fair and certain basis upon which to differentiate between participants 
to a murder and as I am firmly convinced that the law should not be extended to the killer, I 
would depart from the decision of this House in Director of Public Prosecutions for 
Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653 and declare the law to be that duress is not 
available as a defense to a charge of murder, or to attempted murder. I add attempted 
murder because it is to be remembered that the prosecution have to prove an even more evil 
intent to convict of attempted murder than in actual murder. Attempted murder requires 
proof of an intent to kill, whereas in murder it is sufficient to prove an intent to cause really 
serious injury. It cannot be right to allow the defense to one who may be more intent upon 
taking a life than the murderer. This leaves, of course, the anomaly that duress is available 
for the offence of wounding with intent but not to murder if the victim dies subsequently. 
But this flows from the special regard that the law has for human life, it may not be logical 
but it is real and has to be accepted.” (Lord Griffiths, 1987: 17, our italics to underline the 
ratio decidendi) 
 
In the judgment of a superior court, where the legal issue at stake is a complex one, 
several ratio decidendi may be highlighted in the same case, ratio decidendi being the 
legal principle that emerges from the case and subsequently considered as binding in a 
factually similar situation. Indeed, as opposed to the mandatory character of statutes, 
case law is binding only with respect to the particular facts of the case: a precedent is 
followed only insofar as it relates to similar facts. It does not set an absolute general 
rule of law taken in its civilian meaning. Rather, it settles a specific legal issue that 
arose from a particular set of facts and circumstances, as the Earl of Halsbury L.C. 
stated in Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495: 
 
(…) Now, before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1) and what was decided therein, 
there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat 
what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the 
particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions 
which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed 
and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found 
(para. 1). 
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Consequently, as A. L. Goodhart pointed out, ratio decidendi is rooted in the 
“material facts of the case”15 and, as such, the context of the case framed in obiter 
dictum is crucial. 16 The same principle is found in American common law through the 
legal reasoning of analogy. 
 
A court opinion using legal analogy will cite precedents deemed favorable and attempt to 
distinguish precedents deemed unfavorable. The court may attempt to distinguish a 
previous decision by showing that it rests on a different set of facts than the present case or 
that the rationale of the previous decision is inapplicable to the present case (Regan, 2015: 
366). 
 
Under the principle of analogy, like cases should be treated alike in material 
respects. So if case B is like case A, then case B should be decided the same way as 
case A. And if case B is not like case A, then case B should not be decided the same 
way as case A. 
In obiter dictum judges explain their reasoning regarding the facts and the legal 
issues at stake. This part of the judgment can be compared to the reasoning followed by 
the judge to reach ratio decidendi. Obiter dictum, although not binding, is a very 
important part of the case in many respects. Indeed, the framework of the case is 
essential for the legal practitioner who examines the material facts of the case in order 
to know whether it should be regarded as binding or not. It also helps to identify the 
context in which the legal principle has been held and shed light on the scope of the 
decision.17 Moreover, it is in obiter dictum that some of the most beautiful pieces of 
legal reasoning are to be found and where the implementation of the common law 
mechanism of precedent is seen in action. Indeed, in obiter dictum the judge scrutinizes 
the previous decisions held on similar legal issues and assesses whether or not they 
should be regarded as binding upon the present case.  
Although the elements contained in obiter dictum are not binding, they can be re-
used by other judges in their legal reasoning or even in subsequent ratio decidendi. In 
this respect, it is worth quoting the R. v Howe case a second time since it is relevant 
when analysed in relation to R v Gott as a good illustration of the way obiter dictum can 
later be re-used as ratio decidendi (see Example 4). 
 
 
R. v Howe & Bannister [1987] AC 417 R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412 
As I can find no fair and certain 
basis upon which to differentiate between 
participants to a murder and as I am firmly 
convinced that the law should not be 
extended to the killer, I would depart from 
the decision of this House in Director of 
Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v. 
Lynch [1975] A.C. 653 and declare the law 
to be that duress is not available as a 
(…) As lord Griffiths pointed out 
in the passage which I have just referred, 
an intent to kill must be proved in the 
case of attempted murder but not 
necessarily in the case of a murder. Is 
there logic in affording the defense to 
one who intends to kill but fails and 
denying it to the one who mistakenly 
kills intending only to injure ? 
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defense to a charge of murder, or to 
attempted murder. I add attempted murder 
because it is to be remembered that the 
prosecution have to prove an even more 
evil intent to convict of attempted murder 
than in actual murder. Attempted murder 
requires proof of an intent to kill, whereas 
in murder it is sufficient to prove an intent 
to cause really serious injury. It cannot be 
right to allow the defense to one who may 
be more intent upon taking a life than the 
murderer. This leaves, of course, the 
anomaly that duress is available for the 
offence of wounding with intent but not to 
murder if the victim dies subsequently. But 
this flows from the special regard that the 
law has for human life, it may not be 
logical but it is real and has to be accepted. 
(Lord Griffiths, our italics to underline the 
ratio decidendi, the rest being obiter 
dictum) 
It is of course true that 
withholding the defense in any 
circumstances will create some 
abnormalities but I would agree with 
Lord Griffiths that nothing should be 
done to undermine in any way the 
highest duty of the law to protect the 
freedom and lives of those that live under 
it. I can therefore see no justification in 
logic, morality or law in affording to an 
attempted murderer the defense which is 
withheld from a murderer. (Lord Jauncey 
of Tullichettle. Our italics to underline 
the ratio decidendi, the rest being obiter 
dictum). 
Example 4: Illustration of how obiter dictum is re-used  
as ratio decidendi in a subsequent case 
 
In American common law, the distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum 
is less commonly used since American lawyers and judges use the expression “holding” 
to refer to the British ratio decidendi. Nevertheless, in any ruling handed down by US 
Supreme Court Justices, there is a part of the decision that will legally bind the lower 
courts in similar cases. To sum up, the ratio decidendi or holding is based, in both 
countries, on the same legal doctrine of stare decisis, i.e. “to keep to what has been 
decided before.” Even if, at first sight, words or expressions may appear different, the 
principles and mechanisms at the core of American and English common law systems 
are widely similar. The rule of precedent is one of them. It first appeared in 1861 when 
the House of Lords stated that it felt it was bound by its own decisions, and is also 
applied in American common law. The question, therefore, is whether the rule of 
precedent is applied in the same way in American and British law. 
Some legal scholars argue that the rule of precedent is more flexible in the American 
legal system than in the UK's. A quotation from Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co. 
(285 U.S. 393) by Justice Brandeis (dissenting) illustrates this flexibility: 
 
Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res judicata, universal inexorable command. The rule of 
stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question 
entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question 
once decided (405-406). 
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This affirmation emphasizes the flexible nature of precedent in American Common 
law. It is not uncommon for the US Supreme Court to overrule its previous decisions if 
they are no longer considered relevant, fair or justified. In 1992, in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern PA v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Justice O'Connor wrote: 
 
Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our understanding of 
it has changed (and because no other indication of weakened precedent has been shown), 
the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the prior law with any justification beyond a 
present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Court of 1973. To overrule 
prior law for no other reason than that would run counter to the view, repeated in our cases, 
that a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that 
a prior case was wrongly decided (864). 
 
Perhaps the most spectacular example of overruling precedents is the case Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, mentioned earlier, in which the US Supreme Court 
struck down the legal principle of separate but equal that it had itself formerly 
established in Plessy v. Ferguson. The interpretation of the Constitution changed 
between the end of the 19th century and the middle of the 20th century, henceforth 
granting the court the right to depart from its own legal precedent: 
 
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. 
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. 
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected (Justice Warren, 1954: 482-483). 
 
Even though British law lords were bound by their own judgments until 1966, it 
seems that the rule of precedent has also been applied with some degree of adaptability 
in English common law. As a matter of fact, the notion of judge-made law is frequently 
presented as being adaptable to the current needs of society. Judges may create or adapt 
the law in accordance with the new societal context in which it is applicable. An 
example of the adaptability of judge-made law and the power of creation of judges may 
be seen in the Gillick case, in which Lord Denning refuses to consider precedents that 
originated in Victorian England but were still binding in 1985: 
 
 (…) I would get rid of the rule in Re Agar-Ellis and of the suggested exceptions to it. That 
case was decided in the year 1883. It reflects the attitude of a Victorian parent towards his 
children. He expected unquestioning obedience to his commands (…). The common law 
can, and should, keep pace with the times. It should declare, in conformity with the recent 
report of the Committee on the Age of Majority (Cmnd 3342) that the legal right of a parent 
to the custody of a child ends at the eighteenth birthday and even up till then, it is a 
dwindling right which the courts will hesitate to enforce against the wishes of the child, the 
older he is. It starts with a right of control and ends with little more than advice (Parker L.J., 
1986: 129; our italics). 
 
Hence, one might more readily refer to the British common law as being adaptable, 
in comparison to American common law which could more appropriately be 
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characterised as flexible. In spite of this minor difference, the rule of precedent gives a 
good example of one aspect of common law which is common to both the US and the 
UK. 
With regard to dissenting opinions, one may wonder why they are integrated into 
American and British judicial decisions when only the majority opinion of the US 
Supreme Court or the judgment of the UK Supreme Court is legally binding. 
In American common law, every case is more or less based on a reading of the US 
Constitution construed through either a narrow or a wide interpretation. The former 
provides that if the constitution does not say something can be done, then it cannot be 
done, while the latter says that if the constitution does not say something cannot be 
done, then it can be done. Based on the plurality of possible constitutional 
interpretations, American common law allows judges to share their points of view on 
the case, including in dissenting opinions. As a result, the final text is polyphonic, like a 
piece of music in which different voices are heard which sometimes harmonize while at 
other times they are dissonant. It is thus important to be able to detect the linguistic 
signs underlying the polyphony in US Supreme Court decisions. The ‘flashback’ 
structure illustrates this polyphony with expressions such as ante used to refer to what 
has been said previously in another part of the decision, sometimes in the opinion of the 
Court. In Deborah Morse, et al., Petitioners v. Joseph Frederick, a case related to the 
First Amendment and the constitutionality of the measures implemented by public 
schools to prohibit students from displaying messages promoting the use of illegal 
drugs at school-supervised events, one judge, Justice Stevens dissented and wrote: 
 
I would hold, however, that the school's interest in protecting its students from exposure to 
speech reasonably regarded as promoting illegal drug use, ante, at 1, cannot justify 
disciplining Frederick for his attempt to make an ambiguous statement to a television 
audience simply because it contained an oblique reference to drugs (Stevens, dissenting, 
2007: 1). 
 
Furthermore, the most significant interest of dissenting opinions from the legal point 
of view is their persuasive force, i.e. the fact they constitute incentives for lower court 
judges. In subsequent cases dealing with similar issues, they can reinforce a judge's 
argument when s/he may want to overrule a precedent and require arguments and 
justifications to do so. In the UK, judges, and especially justices of superior courts, are 
highly respected. The foundation of this respect is perhaps as social as it is legal. British 
legal professionals benefit from it all the more so as senior judges are former barristers 
who generally receive a knighthood. As such, a minority opinion written by a British 
senior judge, even though it may have no legal enforceability on the case stated, is 
nonetheless considered as valuable and worth being brought to the attention of 
practising lawyers. Moreover, the value of the dissenting opinion may appear relevant 
later, for example in appeal, when the superior court supports the position of the 
dissenting judge in the lower court or when the dissenting opinion presented at any 
given time becomes the one on which case law is overturned later on. 
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Finally, dissenting opinions can be read retrospectively as an anticipation of what 
may later occur as can be seen in Justice Black's dissenting opinion in the US case of 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 393 U.S. 503, which 
related to the constitutionality of a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in 
public school as a form of symbolic protest:  
 
One does not need to be a prophet or the son of a prophet to know that, after the Court's 
holding today, some students in Iowa schools -- and, indeed, in all schools -- will be ready, 
able, and willing to defy their teachers on practically all orders. […] I wish, therefore, 
wholly to disclaim any purpose on my part to hold that the Federal Constitution compels 
the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the American 
public school system to public school students. I dissent (Black, dissenting, 1969: 525-526). 
 
Some years later, in Deborah Morse, et al., Petitioners v. Joseph Frederick, Justice 
Thomas wrote in his concurring opinion: 
 
Justice Black may not have been “a prophet or the son of a prophet,” but his dissent in 
Tinker has proved prophetic 393 U. S. at 525. [...] We need look no further than this case 
for an example: Frederick asserts a constitutional right to utter at a school event what is 
either “[g]ibberish,” ante, at 7, or an open call to use illegal drugs. To elevate such 
impertinence to the status of constitutional protection would be farcical and would indeed 
be to “surrender control of the American public school system to public school students.” 
Tinker, supra, at 526 (Thomas, 2007: 12-13). 
 
In American and British common law alike, dissenting opinions can thus be seen to 
play a vital role in a legal system based on case law and as such are fully integrated in 
the ruling. The final text of the decision is shaped by British and American judges 
according to their own reasoning methods. However, do judges from both countries 
have the same legal reasoning techniques? Do these mechanisms have an impact on the 
language used in superior court decisions?  
 
 
4. Language and legal reasoning mechanisms  
 
In the UK, when a point of law is raised, judges have to give a decision regarding the 
points of law and, when necessary, an interpretation of statutory provisions. This 
interpretation will become as binding as the statutory provisions themselves. As pointed 
out by David (1972: 81), “English statutes truly become English law after they have 
been enshrined in judicial decisions”.18 However, in British common law the judge's 
power of interpretation is narrowly circumscribed by reading techniques: words must be 
construed literally sticking to their plain sense, either legal or ordinary depending upon 
the context. However where no text defines the issue, judges will create new legal terms 
and principles. 
The legal techniques of interpretation are organized according to a hierarchy of rules 
that significantly limit the power of judges. The literal rule of interpretation, also known 
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as “the plain meaning rule”  ̶ not to be confused with Plain English ̶  prevails in any 
situation where the terms of the statute are clear enough, even if the result is considered 
unsatisfactory. However, when the terms of the Act are not clear, the second rule of 
statutory interpretation, called the “golden rule”, can be used. According to this rule, 
judges can depart from the literal rule so as to avoid any absurdity in the result of the 
interpreting process. As expounded by Lord Esher in R v Judge of the City of London 
Court [1892] 1 Q.B. 273: 
 
“(…) If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a 
manifest absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature 
has committed an absurdity.” [literal rule] “In my opinion, the rule has always been this - if 
the words of an Act admit of two interpretations, then they are not clear; and if one 
interpretation leads to an absurdity, and the other does not, the Court will conclude that the 
legislature did not intend to lead to an absurdity, and will adopt the other interpretation.” 
[golden rule] (290, hook brackets added to highlight the use of the literal rule and the 
golden rule).  
 
Where the first two rules of interpretation cannot solve the difficulty, judges resort 
to the third called “the mischief” or “defect rule”: they scrutinize Parliament's original 
purpose and intention when the Act was passed in order to come to an appropriate 
interpretation of the Act. One famous illustration of this technique can be found in a 
criminal case relating to six prostitutes who challenged their charges of solicitation 
under the Street Offences Act 1959, arguing that they were soliciting in private premises 
from behind their windows or from their balconies. In Smith v Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 
830, Lord Parker provides an illustration of the mischief rule: 
 
(…) Everybody knows that this was an Act to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk 
along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in this 
way it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing 
in the doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or 
half open (832). 
 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the particular technique of teleological analysis 
has been more recently used by British judges. This technique, which refers to the spirit 
of the text, is hardly ever applied for interpreting British statutes which usually tend to 
be very detailed and accurate. Nevertheless, it sometimes helps British judges to 
interpret European Union Regulations that are mostly written in typically civilian style, 
with which British judges are neither familiar nor at ease.  
In American common law, the question of the interpretation of a (federal or state) 
law is settled through a reading of the US Constitution. Every case decided by the US 
Supreme Court boils down to a constitutional question. Justices have to decide if the 
statutory provisions of the piece of legislation being challenged are in keeping with the 
supreme law of the land. Justice Frankfurter once said in his concurring opinion in 
Graves v. New York 306 U.S. 466, that “the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is 
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the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it” (491-492). Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, as early as 1899, stated that “We do not ask what the lawmaker could have 
meant; we do not try to know what the Act means”.19 An American judge does not 
consider himself a collaborator of the lawmaker (Levasseur, 2004: 118). His role is not 
to find the intention of the legislative body behind the text. This is the reason why the 
main method of legal interpretation in the American common law system is the plain 
meaning rule, and only if the textual interpretation leads to absurd and unfair solutions 
will the intention of the lawmaker be analysed.  
Finally, when no legal provision regulates the issue at stake, common law judges 
have the power to create new legal principles that will subsequently rule the issue and 
bind lower courts. One of the best examples of British judge-made law and its 
subsequent terminological creations is the well-known “neighbour principle”. The 
principle was created by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100, also 
known as the “Snail in the Bottle case”, according to which reasonable care must be 
taken to avoid acts or omissions likely to injure “a neighbour”. The legal principles 
ruling liability for negligence were based on this case, giving rise to new developments 
of tort law. This mechanism has subsequently been referred to as the “neighbour 
principle”: 
 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee 
would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour? The answer 
seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my acts that I ought 
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my 
minds to the acts or omissions which are called in question (Lord Atkin, 580). 
 
All the legal criteria on which negligence is based are present in this paragraph: 
negligence can be established when the tortfeasor is in a position where s/he could 
foresee the damage caused by his/her act to the victim and has failed to prevent it from 
happening. 
Similarly, US Supreme Court Justices have the power to interpret the text of the US 
Constitution so as to establish rights that have not explicitly been expressed in the 
supreme law of the land. This was the case in landmark case Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) on abortion:  
 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, 
however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 
(1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain 
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. [...] This right of privacy, 
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and 
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the 
Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a 
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy (Justice Blackmun, 1973: 152-
153). 
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This quotation illustrates the power of US Supreme Court Justices to create and 
develop new legal principles through a wide interpretation of constitutional provisions. 
This is the American version of judge-made law applied pursuant to the doctrine 
established in 1819 in McCullogh v. Maryland 100 U.S. 421:  
 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which 
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional (421). 
 
Additionally, the power of creation of common law judges, British and American 
alike, sometimes goes beyond the establishment of a legal principle, giving rise to 
practical legal tools for practitioners. When ruling on a case, judges have the possibility 
to set principles and define tools that may be taken up in future legal situations. In the 
Gillick case already mentioned, in obiter dictum Lord Fraser introduced a 
comprehensive test that helped medical practitioners assess whether they would be 
failing to discharge their professional responsibilities by providing contraceptive advice 
to a minor without parental consent: 
 
(…) But there may well be cases, and I think there will be some cases, where the girl 
refuses either to tell the parents herself or to permit the doctor to do so and in such cases the 
doctor will, in my opinion, be justified in proceeding without the parents' consent or even 
knowledge provided he is satisfied on the following matters: (1) that the girl (although 
under 16 years of age) will understand his advice (2) that he cannot persuade her to inform 
her parents or to allow him to inform the parents that she is seeking contraceptive advice (3) 
that she is very likely to begin or to continue having sexual intercourse with or without 
contraceptive treatment (4) that unless she receives contraceptive advice or treatment her 
physical or mental health or both are likely to suffer (5) that her best interests require him to 
give her contraceptive advice, treatment or both without the parental consent (our italics, 
1986: 174). 
 
Lord Fraser based this test on five criteria that must be assessed by any medical 
practitioner before making the decision to prescribe such a treatment or procedure to 
girls who are underage. Though this test was created with “contraceptive treatments” in 
mind (to quote Lord Fraser himself), it was later considered to be sufficiently clear and 
useful to be used in any situation when a minor seeks medical advice or treatment 
without informing his/her parents. Since that date, this test has been known as the 
“Gillick competence test” for academics and practitioners, and has been adapted to 
other cases when a practitioner needs to assess the maturity of the child.  
Similarly, in the 1966 American criminal case Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 
which gave rise to the famous “Miranda Rights”, US Supreme Court Justices 
established legal and professional guidelines for law enforcement to respect when a 
suspect is arrested and taken into police custody: 
 
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are 
devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous 
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opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, 
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does 
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an 
attorney, either retained or appointed (our italics, 444). 
 
These two cases, one British, the other American, underscore the power of common 
law judges to set out principles and legal tools for professionals both in the UK and the 
US. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has highlighted the existence of some common features in the American and 
English common law systems such as a largely common language, as well as similar 
concepts, principles and procedures. English common law undoubtedly remains the 
original and founding source of American law. The comparison between American and 
British decisions handed down by US and UK superior courts, through a legal and 
linguistic analysis, has highlighted these convergences. The rule of precedent is 
similarly implemented in both legal systems in spite of minor structural differences 
pointed out in the judicial decisions that have been studied.  
Nevertheless, there are differences which indicate quite clearly that the American 
and the English common law systems not so common after all. The legal terminology is 
both similar and different, as illustrated by the term ‘judicial review’ present in both 
systems but which does not refer to the same legal reality. Moreover, while English and 
American judges are both empowered to create new legal concepts, the way in which 
texts are interpreted (and court decisions drafted) are distinct. In addition, the flexibility 
used by American judges is not strictly comparable to the adaptability that characterises 
English common law  ̶  leading us to conclude that, with regard to the cross-cultural 
aspects of even close-culture disciplines, a constant look-out for “false” or “true” 
friends is an undisputable prerequisite.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. 47 States are pure common law systems, without counting the bi-juridical ones. See 
<www.juriglobe.ca/fra/sys-juri/class-poli/common-law.php>, consulted on 23 July 2015. 
2. See Waghorn v Waghorn, 297: Dixon, J., in an Australian case: “Where a general 
proposition is involved the court should be careful to avoid introducing in Australia a principle 
inconsistent with that accepted in England. The common law is administered in many 
jurisdictions and unless each guards against needless divergencies of decision its uniform 
development is imperilled”. 
3. See Zoller (2014): 5, consulted on 23 July 2015. 
 4. For more information on the US Supreme Court, see the US Supreme Court website: 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/>, consulted on 23 September 2015. 
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5. Interestingly, the American term used to refer to the application before the US Supreme 
Court, “to file for a writ of certiorari”, comes from English common law which abolished this 
terminology in 1938. The UK has replaced it with the more transparent expression “application 
for permission to appeal”.  
6. See <https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/uk-judicial-system.html>. 
7. Section 124(2) Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. 
8. On these particularities, see the UK Supreme Court website: 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/jurisdiction-of-the-supreme-court-in-scottish-
appeals.pdf>, consulted on 27 July 2015. 
9. The following Acts are of constitutional nature with regard to continental standards: 
Magna Carta 1215, Habeas Corpus Act 1679, Bill of Rights 1689, Act of Union 1707, Act of 
Union 1801, Human Rights Act 1998. 
10. On the power of the UK Supreme Court with respect to constitutional protections, see 
Olivier Deparis (July 2011). “La Cour suprême au Royaume-Uni et la question de 
constitutionnalité”, Nouveaux Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel n° 32 (Dossier: Royaume-
Uni). Available online at <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel/francais/nouveaux-cahiers-du-
conseil/cahier-n-32/la-cour-supreme-au-royaume-uni-et-la-question-de-constitutionalite-par-
olivier-deparis.99061.html>, consulted on 27 July 2015. 
11. For the definition of judicial review, see the website of federal courts in the USA: 
<http://www.uscourts.gov/>, consulted on 23 September 2015. 
12. The British and Irish Legal Information Institute (BAILII) website publishes British 
and Irish case law and legislation, European Union case law, Law Commission reports, and 
other law-related British and Irish material.  
13. In the American context, the word 'judgment' refers to the outcome of the case as 
opposed to the holding, i.e. the legal reasons and arguments presented to justify the judgment. 
In the UK, a judgment is used to refer both to the outcome and the legal reasoning from which 
it ensues. 
14. E.g. in the famous Gillick case, Lord Fraser is clearly organizing his reasoning 
considering the grounds for appeal with digits from 1 to 6. See Gillick v West Norfolk & 
Wisbeck Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton’s opinion. 
15. A. L. Goodhart: “Determining the ratio decidendi of a case” (1930) 40 Yale LJ 161 and 
Goodhart: “The ratio decidendi of a case” (1959) 22MLR 117. 
16. Cf Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571 and Merritt v Merritt [1970] 1 WLR 1211. In 
these two cases the enforcement of a maintenance agreement passed between spouses that were 
not living together was claimed. However, the position of Balfour was not considered as 
binding on the Merritt case because the context of the agreement was different. In the Balfour 
case, the spouses were living apart because of some health problem that prevented the wife to 
follow her husband abroad. In the Merritt case the spouses were living apart because they were 
about to get divorced. The lack of contractual intention presumption in agreement passed by 
spouses that was held in Balfour was not extended to an agreement passed by a couple who was 
about to divorce such as the one in the Merritt case. 
17. On this issue, see Hans-Albreicht Schwarz-Lieberman von Wahlendorf (1999), “Le 
juge ‘législateur’ l’approche anglaise”. RIDC 4: 1109-1117. 
18. See David, H. (1972). Introduction à l'étude du droit écossais. Paris: LGDJ: 81. “la loi 
anglaise n’est véritablement incorporée au droit anglais que lorsqu’elle a reçu la consécration 
de la jurisprudence”. Quotation translated into English by L. Francoz Terminal. 
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19. Holmes, Oliver Wendell (1899). “The Theory of Interpretation”. Harvard Law Review 
12: 417-420. Quoted in S&E Contractors, INC. v. United States 406 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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